Power plays and balancing acts:the paradoxical effects of Chinese trade on African foreign policy positions by Carmody, Padraig et al.
 
 
University of Birmingham
Power plays and balancing acts
Carmody, Padraig; Dasandi, Niheer; Mikhaylov, Slava
DOI:
10.1177/0032321719840962
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Carmody, P, Dasandi, N & Mikhaylov, S 2019, 'Power plays and balancing acts: the paradoxical effects of
Chinese trade on African foreign policy positions', Political Studies, pp. 1-23.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719840962
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is the accepted version of the following article Carmody, P, Dasandi, N & Mikhaylov, S. (2019) 'Power plays and balancing acts: the
paradoxical effects of Chinese trade on African foreign policy positions', Political Studies, pp. 1-23, which has been published in final form at
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321719840962
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
Power Plays and Balancing Acts: The Paradoxical
Effects of Chinese Trade on African Foreign Policy
Positions ∗
Pádraig Carmody
Trinity College Dublin & University of Johannesburg
carmodyp@tcd.ie
Niheer Dasandi
University of Birmingham
n.dasandi@bham.ac.uk
Slava Jankin Mikhaylov
Hertie School of Governance
jankin@hertie-school.org
Forthcoming in Political Studies, accepted 9 March 2019
Abstract
There has been substantial focus on China’s influence in Africa in recent years. Some
argue that China’s growing economic ties with African states have increased its political
influence across the continent. This paper examines whether trade with China leads
African states to adopt more similar foreign policy preferences to China in the United
Nations. We examine foreign policy similarity using voting patterns in the UN General
Assembly and country statements in the UN General Debate. The analysis demonstrates
that more trade with China has paradoxical effects on foreign policy positions of African
states – it leads them to align more closely with US foreign policy positions in the UN,
except on human rights votes. Our findings suggest that African states are engaged in
balancing behavior with external powers whereby African elites seek to play off rival
powers against one another in order to strengthen their own autonomy and maximize
trade.
Key Words: China, Africa, foreign policy preferences, trade, United Nations, General
Debate, General Assembly, text analysis
∗Authors’ names are listed in alphabetical order. Authors have contributed equally to all work. We would
like to thank Lior Erez, Federico Maria Ferrara, Stephan Haggard, Jeffrey Kucik, and Henry Thomson for their
incredibly helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper.
1 Introduction
China’s emergence as a powerful actor in the global economy represents a fundamental
shift in the global balance of power. This has led to questions about the political implica-
tions of China’s growing economic power, and the extent to which it uses this as a tool of
foreign policy. This is especially so as China has increasingly sought to play a more active
role in global politics in recent times – resulting in a more dynamic and expansive foreign
policy (Tull, 2006). According to Lanteigne (2015, 9), the primary goal of Chinese foreign
policy is “to better manage the forces of globalization for the betterment of the state while
ensuring that the Communist Party maintains its paramount role in Chinese governance”.
Indeed, China has sought to gain allies around the world to ward off what are seen as
Western attempts to undermine Communist Party rule, and to lock in sources of natural
resource supply and markets for Chinese production (Lanteigne, 2015). China’s expanding
economic ties around the world are seen by some as aimed at serving these foreign policy
objectives, and nowhere has China’s economic engagements come under greater scrutiny
than in Africa.
China-Africa relations have a long history going back to Mao Zedong and Zhou En-
lai’s prominent role in the non-aligned movement in the 1960s (Taylor, 1998; Carmody
and Owusu, 2007; Mohan and Power, 2008; Brautigam, 2009).1 These have expanded
over recent decades, and China is now the single biggest trade partner with African states
(Romei, 2015). Despite, or perhaps because of, China’s stated approach being based on
non-interference in partner countries’ domestic affairs, many view its growing trade with
Africa as enhancing its political influence on the continent (see Tull, 2006). This influ-
ence is seen to come at the expense of traditional powers in Africa, particularly the US
– with different US governments expressing concern over China’s increasing presence in
Africa (Wonacott, 2011; Smith, 2012). Most notably, the Trump administration unveiled a
new strategy for US engagement in Africa in late 2018, which was designed specifically to
counter Beijing’s growing influence across the continent (Calamur, 2018). This has meant
Africa is increasingly seen as the principal site of the US and China’s struggle for global
influence.2
Some, however, question this view of the political effects of China’s economic engage-
ment with African states. Brautigam (2009), for example, argues that China’s economic
involvement in Africa is less about seeking political influence, and more about developing
a longer-term economic partnership. Furthermore, she argues that China is open about the
nature of this relationship and, therefore, African governments are in a position to shape the
relationship. Others have also highlighted the agency of African governments, particular
regarding relations with China (e.g. Mohan and Lampert, 2013; Corkin, 2016; Brown and
Harman, 2013). In particular, some argue that African governments have, at times, sought
to resist Chinese political influence, and to use China’s growing economic engagement to
balance against Western power (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012). This may suggest that rather
than increasing Chinese political influence, growing trade with China has provided African
states with greater room to manoeuvre regarding their external relations.
Despite these contrasting perspectives, there has been surprisingly little systematic anal-
1Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s tour of Africa in 1964, in which he emphasized the importance of China’s
economic engagement in Africa, is seen as a watershed moment in China-Africa relations (Mohan and Power,
2008; Brautigam, 2009).
2For example, much of the media coverage of the Trump administration’s new strategy for US engagement
in Africa focused on the continent as the “new front in the U.S.-China influence war” (Calamur, 2018).
2
ysis of the effect of economic ties with China on the foreign policy positions of African
states.3 This paper addresses this gap by examining the impact of increased trade with
China on the foreign policy positions of African states in the United Nations (UN). Our anal-
ysis considers different foreign policy dimensions. Existing analyses of the foreign policy
impact of China’s emergence as a major economic power have tended to focus on individual
policy issues considered important to China (e.g. Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013; Strüver,
2016) or on specific events of particular interest to it (e.g. Kastner, 2016). Less attention
has been given to the broader foreign policy consequences of trade with China, despite it
long being recognized that countries’ foreign policy relations may differ across issues (Keo-
hane and Nye, 1977). To assess the impact of China’s increased trade with Africa across
multiple foreign policy dimensions, we employ two different types of measure of foreign
policy position. The first is a new measure derived from the application of text analysis
to countries’ annual statements in the UN General Debate. As we explain, states are more
freely able to signal their foreign policy positions in their General Debate speeches, provid-
ing us with a “softer” measure of foreign policy preference. The second measure is based on
countries’ voting patterns in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Importantly, we consider
voting similarity across different dimensions, such as all UNGA resolutions, human rights
resolutions, and votes on issues deemed important by the US government.
Our analysis shows that increased Chinese trade with African countries has a paradoxical
impact, in that it leads African countries to move closer to the US and away from China
on different foreign policy dimensions. It is only on voting on UN resolutions linked to
human rights – where the perceived need to project “hard shell sovereignty” against Western
intervention is important (Barma et al., 2009) – that more trade with China is associated
with closer alignment between China and African states. These findings are consistent when
we address potential endogeneity between trade and foreign policy positions. We argue
that these results suggest African states use trade with China to attempt to strengthen their
position globally by balancing Chinese against Western power to achieve greater autonomy
and “non-interference” in their internal affairs, and to maximize policy rents.
2 Trade, Foreign Policy, and China-Africa Relations
China’s emergence as a major economic power has led to renewed attention to the foreign
policy consequences of trade (see e.g. Ross, 2006; Rotberg, 2009; Flores-Macías and Kreps,
2013). The links between economic relations and political influence has long been a subject
of academic interest. More than 70 years ago, in his influential text, National Power and the
Structure of Foreign Trade, Hirschman (1945) argued that trade between countries would
lead to foreign policy convergence. This convergence would occur, he explained, due to
concerns that foreign policy disputes could disrupt trade relations, and therefore interfere
with economic growth. Furthermore, he argued that because countries would differ in their
relative dependence in particular trade relationships, the threat to interrupt them would be
“an effective weapon in the struggle for power” for the less dependent country (Hirschman,
1945, 17). In other words, trade dependence could provide a state with political influence
over another.
This argument has been applied in the context of China’s international trade in recent
years (e.g. Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013; Ross, 2006; Brazys and Dukalskis, 2017). In par-
3There are some partial exceptions that include coverage of other regions (e.g. Flores-Macías and Kreps,
2013; Strüver, 2016; Kastner, 2016; Brazys and Dukalskis, 2017).
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ticular, it forms the basis for the view that increased trade has provided China with signifi-
cant political influence across Africa (see Tull, 2006; Alden, 2007; Large, 2008; Lumumba-
Kasongo, 2011; Sun, 2014). From this perspective, China’s emergence as the continent’s
largest trade partner has increased bilateral dependence, and as such African states are
thought to align their foreign policy positions with it to ensure that this trade relationship
is maintained. Some, however, have argued that rather than Chinese trade with African
states being a form of hard, coercive, power – trade relations are part of Chinese “soft
power” in Africa. Kurlantzick (2007, 6), for example, argues that “for the Chinese, soft
power means anything outside of the military and security realm" – a perspective shared by
many Chinese scholars (see Fijałkowski, 2011). This notion of trade as soft power through
market access runs counter to Nye’s (2004) original conceptualization, which focuses on
cultural resources and public diplomacy.4
The argument that trade is part of China’s soft power in Africa is in part because the gov-
ernment has influence over trade flows, given its ownership of major resource companies,
such as the oil company Sinopec, for example. However, Chinese trade with African states
is also part of a broader strategy of engagement without macro-level conditions, thereby
offering, if not an alternative development model, at least a counterpoint to the “Washing-
ton Consensus” promoted by Western powers (Taylor, 1998; Carmody and Owusu, 2007;
Thompson et al., 2005; Kurlantzick, 2007). From this perspective, trade might lead to for-
eign policy convergence because it would increase the appeal of China’s approach to eco-
nomic engagement, and international relations more broadly, among African governments
based on the promise of non-interference in the affairs of these countries. In other words,
rather than alignment occurring due to Chinese pressure, foreign policy convergence with
China from this perspective would represent a fundamental shift in the interests and pref-
erences of African governments towards the “Beijing Consensus” through the mechanism
of soft power (see Nye, 2005).
Both perspectives on China-Africa trade – as representing either hard or soft power –
suggest that the growing trade dependency of African states on China should have a similar
outcome; namely foreign policy convergence. Others question this deterministic view of
the effects of Chinese trade on African foreign policy positions, particularly as it ignores or
downplays the agency of African governments (see Brautigam, 2009; Mohan and Lampert,
2013; Corkin, 2016; Brown and Harman, 2013; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012). The view that
trade leads to foreign policy convergence overlooks the ways in which African states may
seek to avoid political influence from China.
This is an argument that has been made more generally beyond the China-Africa con-
text. Scholars have questioned the notion that trade dependence leads to foreign policy
convergence – states that are dependent on a particular trade relationship can turn to other
avenues to counter bargaining disadvantage (Wagner, 1988; David, 1991; Womack, 2006,
2015). Holsti (1978, 515) argues that dependent states can “learn how to maximize their
bargaining advantages and eventually develop the intellectual, technical, and bureaucratic
skills to manage their resources in such a way as to avoid exploitation.” This criticism has
been supported by empirical studies that find little evidence to support the view that trade
dependence leads to foreign policy convergence (see e.g. Richardson and Kegley, 1980).
There are several reasons why such criticism may be especially valid in the context of
China’s trade with African states. Firstly, scholars have argued that as China pursues a “no
4The lack of a clear distinction between instruments of hard and soft power has led some to put forward
a concept of “smart power”, which refers to the use of a combination of soft and hard power in a mutually
reinforcing way (Armitage and Nye, 2007; Wilson, 2008).
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questions asked” foreign policy it appears to be agnostic about the overseas engagements
of “client” or partner states in Africa, except as they relate to recognition of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) over Taiwan (Wenping, 2007; Adem, 2010; Sun, 2014). Instead,
China’s trade with African countries is seen as overwhelmingly driven by economic rather
than political motivations (Brautigam, 2009; Eisenman, 2012; Sun, 2014). As some have
pointed out, this gives African governments significant scope to shape the nature of their
economic and political relations with China (Brautigam, 2009; Mohan and Lampert, 2013;
Lee, 2018).
Second, the argument that trade leads to foreign policy convergence in the China-Africa
context tends to overlook, or significantly downplay, the influence of Western powers, par-
ticularly the US, in Africa.5 Indeed, one of the main issues discussed by scholars and in
the media is the implications of China’s growing role in Africa for the US, which until
recently was the dominant external economic and political power on the continent (see
Tull, 2006; Carmody and Owusu, 2007; Campbell, 2008; Carmody, 2016; Wonacott, 2011;
Smith, 2012). There is a broad consensus that the rise of China in Africa has weakened
the hold of the US and other Western powers over African states. A number of studies
have argued that China’s growing influence in Asia has also led states there to balance their
engagement between it and the USA in order to maximize the benefits from relationships
with both, while limiting their dependence on either (see Chung, 2001; De Castro, 2010;
Ikenberry, 2016). African states may adopt a similar approach as some observers have sug-
gested (Adegoke, 2018). Therefore, far from weakening African governments’ bargaining
power, an important consequence of generally growing economic linkages between African
states and China is that African governments are likely to have a stronger bargaining posi-
tion in relation to the traditional Western powers (Kragelund, 2014). Indeed, as Whitaker
(2010) notes, African leaders have sought to use China’s growing engagement across the
continent to reduce their dependence on the US, in particular.
Third, it is important to recognize the mixed public response in many African countries
to growing commercial ties with China. Some have questioned the portrayal in the Western
media of the public in African countries having an overwhelmingly negative view of Chinese
involvement (see Sautman and Hairong, 2009; Brautigam, 2009). As these studies point
out, there is significant variation and nuance in African views of China-Africa relations. This
is supported by more empirically-based studies conducted on popular perceptions of Chi-
nese involvement in Africa. For example, an Afrobarometer study found that high Chinese
import penetration correlated negatively with perceptions of China, whereas the presence
of foreign direct investment was found to have a negligible impact (Gadzala and Hanusch,
2010). Other studies have found a generally positive public perception of China-Africa
relations in most African countries. However, there have also been high profile instances
of strong negative public responses to Chinese involvement in African countries, some-
times leading to protests (see Gill and Reilly, 2007; Brautigam, 2009; Mohan and Lampert,
2013). Such events have been used, and in part fueled, by populist politicians seeking to
use “the Chinese problem” of increased migration to gain popular support (see Sautman
and Hairong, 2009; Carmody, 2016). This is especially important in the African context,
where it has long been recognized that foreign policy has been a secondary concern for
domestic African elites more concerned with regime maintenance and the establishment of
domestic authority (Herbst, 2014). These “audience effects” are therefore likely to impact
African elites’ foreign policy positions in relation to growing trade with China because these
5Whitaker (2010) discusses the strategies of balancing African states have used to counter US influence in
the continent.
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elites use their foreign policy positions to signal to domestic audiences.
Based on this discussion, the impact of the rise of China has potentially contradictory
effects on African states’ foreign policy positions. On the one hand, it might create incen-
tives to draw closer to China in order to potentially receive more material benefits through
increased flows of trade, investment, and aid, and to strengthen external sovereignty, at
least in relation to the West. For example, closer alignment with China reflects a shift from
a greater concern with ethics in foreign policy under Nelson Mandela’s presidency in South
Africa to ‘realpolitik’ subsequently, with that country abstaining in 2014 on the United Na-
tions vote to refer North Korea to the International Criminal Court, for example (Allison,
2014).6 On the other hand the emergence of an alternative power centre to the United
States and Europe, it could be argued, has allowed some African elites to play off rival
powers against each other in order to strengthen their own autonomy without aligning
with a particular power or bloc (see Carmody and Kragelund, 2016).
This raises an important empirical question. Does greater trade lead African states to
become allies of China or do African states use increased trade to merely balance Chinese
against Western power to achieve greater autonomy and access to resources?7 This paper
seeks to shed light on this question. In order to do this, we systematically examine the
impact of trade on foreign policy alignment between China and African states, using voting
patterns in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and annual statements in the UN General
Debate (GD). Our analysis focuses on examining the various arguments about the impact
of growing China-Africa trade on foreign policy convergence discussed here.
3 Data and Methods
To test whether increases in trade between China and African states lead to alliance or
balancing behavior in African foreign policy positions, we conduct a regression analysis to
examine the effects of trade with China. Our country-year panel data includes observations
for 50 African countries over the years 1971-2013.8
3.1 Outcome Variable: UN Votes and Speeches
We consider two types of measure of foreign policy position in this analysis. The first is
the similarity of voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. This is the most widely used
measure of foreign policy alignment (see Voeten, 2013). The second is based on a new
dataset of countries’ annual statements in the UN General Debate, the UN General Debate
Corpus (UNGDC) (Baturo, Dasandi and Mikhaylov, 2017).9 We apply text analytic methods
to these speeches to derive estimates of foreign policy position at the UN, as we explain
below.
6While there are tensions between North Korea and China, particularly over the former’s nuclear program,
they are close allies, with China supplying more than 80% of North Korea’s imports, and taking more than
80% of its exports.
7This of course raises other issues around international politics. Lord Palmerstone, the British Foreign
Secretary in 1848 famously said that Britain had no permanent allies or enemies, only interests. However,
such a realist perspective largely negates the role of values in international relations.
8Our analysis begins in 1971 as this is the year that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) replaced the
Republic of China (Taiwan) in the United Nations.
9We use the version of the data available from the Harvard Dataverse at http://dx.doi.org/10.
7910/DVN/0TJX8Y.
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The UN General Debate (GD) takes place in New York every September at the start of
each new session of the General Assembly. The GD provides member states with an oppor-
tunity to present their perspectives and preferences on key issues in world politics in formal
statements delivered by heads of state and other high-level country representatives. In ad-
dition to discussing specific events that have occurred, such as conflicts and other crises,
governments highlight broader issues in international politics that they view as important.
The Chinese GD statements in recent years have emphasized a number of issues seen as key
to its foreign policy. This includes the need to respect national sovereignty and countries’
right to choose their own social system and development path, promoting peaceful devel-
opment, greater representation for developing countries in global governance institutions,
and the importance of economic cooperation and multilateralism.
There are a number of important characteristics of the GD, and ways in which GD
speeches differ from voting in the UNGA, which have important implications for measures
of foreign policy position. In the UNGA countries vote on a set of issues that have been
placed on its formal agenda. As a result, voting in the UNGA can easily be compared across
countries and over time, which is in large part why it has become the main measure of
states’ foreign policy positions. In contrast, states can use their GD statement to discuss any
issue considered to be of importance, without being restricted by the issues on the formal
agenda. As Smith (2006, 122) notes, a key function of the GD is “to act as a barometer of
international opinion on important issues, even those not on the agenda for that particular
session".
This distinction between UN speeches and votes relates to a broader difference between
the two, which is that governments face fewer external constraints when delivering state-
ments in the UN General Debate than when voting in the UNGA (see Baturo, Dasandi and
Mikhaylov, 2017). The manner in which states are restricted to voting on issues that are on
the formal agenda is one example of an external constraint not faced by governments when
delivering speeches. A second and, arguably, more important external constraint comes
from the way in which UNGA voting – unlike GD statements – is institutionally connected
to decision-making and political outcomes. In other words, countries’ votes in the UNGA
can lead to the adoption or rejection of a UN resolution. As a result, external factors such
as trade relations and aid flows have a greater influence on how countries may vote in
the UNGA, as a number of studies demonstrate (see Kim and Russett, 1996; Wang, 1999;
Voeten, 2000; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2008). For exam-
ple, the US can cut aid to countries which vote against it on issues designated as important
or strategic in the UNGA. In contrast, GD statements are not institutionally connected to
decision-making in the UN. This means that these statements are less likely to be subject
to external pressures, and states have more freedom in the positions they take and are able
to discuss more contentious issues. It also means that the General Debate is one of the
few international arenas where smaller or less powerful nations in the international system
have the opportunity to have their voices heard (see Baturo, Dasandi and Mikhaylov, 2017;
Smith, 2006; Luard and Heater, 1994; Nicholas, 1959).
To examine these positions, we include a measure of foreign policy stances derived from
GD statements, in addition to measures based on UNGA voting, as the former captures a
different dimension of foreign policy similarity. The relative absence of external constraints
and political consequences for GD speeches means that it provides us with a “softer” mea-
sure of foreign policy position than UNGA voting (Baturo, Dasandi and Mikhaylov, 2017).
In other words, there are fewer implications for what governments choose to speak about
in the General Debate. If increased trade with China leads to African governments’ express-
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ing policy positions in their GD statements that are more aligned with China, this would
provide some indication that trade with African states is a form of soft power for China.
Hence, using measures of foreign policy position derived from votes and speeches should
provide us with a more complete picture of the impact of trade with China on the foreign
policy positions of African states.
In order to derive a measure of foreign policy similarity from countries’ GD statements,
we use Wordscores, a text scaling algorithm developed by Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003),
which is a standard and widely used procedure in political science for text classification.
Wordscores classifies unseen target documents (known as the test set), based on their word
frequencies, into known, a priori defined categories (“pro-China” vs “pro-USA”). This con-
stitutes scaling the documents in the test set on a single dimension that is defined by these
pre-selected categories. To this end, we define the training set (which is a set of documents
that are known to belong to one of the categories) as speeches made by China and the USA.
Based on the word frequencies in the training set, the algorithm calculates the condi-
tional probability that an unknown document with its word frequencies belongs to one of
the two categories (“pro-China” or “pro-US”). Wordscores calculates the latent position of
each document in the test set as the arithmetic mean of the posterior probabilities. 10 Fig-
ure 1 shows a ridgeline plot with density plots of the positions of African states according to
the Wordscores measure over time. The ridgeline plot enables us to observe the distribution
of African states’ positions on the China-USA dimension for each individual year between
1971 and 2013. A comparison of the distributions shows greater alignment with the US
early in the time series, followed by a shift towards the Chinese position since the 1980s.
The maps in Figure 2 show the positions of African states based on the Wordscores measure
in 1980 and 2010. The maps provide some validation of the measure. For example, Kenya
was a close US ally during the Cold War as can be seen in the 1980 map; however with the
end of the Cold War, Kenya moved to the East African average as seen in the 2010 map.
In addition to a text-based measure of foreign policy position, we include measures
based on countries’ voting patterns in the UNGA. As we have noted, using UNGA voting
patterns is the standard approach to analyzing foreign policy proximity in international re-
lations research. This is because UNGA voting provides information about countries’ pref-
erences on the same set of issues over time, which can be easily compared. We use roll call
voting data from Voeten (2013). We calculate the similarity of voting that countries have
with China as the number of times in a given year that a country votes the same way as
China as a proportion of the total number of votes in the year. We consider voting similar-
ity across a number of different types of UNGA resolutions. Specifically, we look at voting
similarity across all resolutions for a given year, on human rights-related resolutions, and res-
olutions on which China and the USA disagreed in their voting. Figure 3 presents a ridgeline
plot of changing distribution of voting similarities across three areas.These figures show the
distribution of African countries’ voting similarities with China for each year between 1971
and 2013.
We also consider human rights-related resolutions because “China adamantly defends
state sovereignty, views external interference in a state’s human rights as an unwelcome
10We use quanteda R-package (Benoit, 2018) for text pre-processing and Wordscores estimation. We follow
standard preprocessing: tokenization, stemming and normalization, and stopword removal and controlled
vocabulary filtering (Manning, Raghavan and Schütze, 2008). For analysis, we set training (reference) texts
with China (-1) and the USA (+1). Predicted scores for the test set documents were then rescaled to these
bounds (Martin and Vanberg, 2008). We estimate separate models for each year, taking GD speeches in that
year as the corpus for Wordscores; while maintaining consistent training set (China and US speeches in that
year) ensures we estimate positions on the same underlying dimension over time.
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Figure 1: Foreign policy positions over time. Changes in the densities of positions of African
states from Wordscore classification of GD statements in relation to the USA (+1) and China
(-1).
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Figure 2: General Debate statements in 1980 and 2010. The maps show African states’
position in relation to the USA (+1) and China (-1) in 1980 and 2010 according to the
Wordscore measure applied to GD statements.
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challenge... and takes visible international stands defending a state’s sovereignty relative
to human rights considerations" (Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013, 361). Furthermore, as
Flores-Macías and Kreps (2013, 361) explain, China has been very consistent in its voting
in opposition to human rights resolutions in the UNGA. Therefore, voting on human rights
resolutions in the UNGA allows us to examine a foreign policy issue of importance to the
Chinese government, and an issue on which China has been consistent in its stance over
time. In the additional analysis (below), we also consider voting similarity on issues con-
sidered important by the US State Department (see Wang, 1999), and look at the similarity
of African states’ voting patterns with the US.
3.2 Explanatory Variable
In considering how trade with China impacts African states’ foreign policy positions, our
main explanatory variable is the share of trade entered into by an individual country with
China. This is the sum of a country’s total imports and exports with China as a proportion of
the country’s total trade for a given year. We use dyadic trade data from the UN COMTRADE
database to calculate the given country’s trade share with China. We focus on trade share
with China rather than overall trade because it better captures the level of trade dependence
from one country to another (see Barbieri, 1996). We present distributions of the African
states’ trade share with China for each year of the analysis using a ridgeline plot in Figure
4. We observe a general trend of higher proportion of trade with China over time, while
simultaneously an increasing heterogeneity among African states. In 2013, the median
trade share with China was at 11%, third quartile at 18% and maximum at 50%.
3.3 Other Control Variables
We also include additional variables in our model to control for other factors that may
influence countries’ trade relations or foreign policy positions. These additional control
variables consist of a standard set of political and economic variables, such as countries’
Polity scores (Marshall and Jaggers, 2016); countries’ levels of wealth, which we measure
by GDP per capita (logged); and the size of a country’s population (logged). The data
for GDP per capita and population are taken from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (WDI).
As changes in the amount of trade a particular country engages in with China may be
related to general changes in its levels of trade, we also include trade as a proportion of
GDP as a control. This is calculated using trade data from the UN COMTRADE database and
GDP data from the World Bank’s WDI. We also control for how resource rich countries are
by including a variable on a country’s total natural resources as a proportion of GDP using
data from the World Bank’s WDI. As the foreign policy positions of individual countries may
have been influenced by the Cold War context, we include a dummy variable for post Cold
War years. We also control for the potential influence of the USA. We include a variable
that captures countries’ trade share with the US. This is calculated in the same way as trade
share with China. We also include a variable that captures the amount of aid received from
the US by a particular country as a share of its GDP, also taken from the World Bank’s WDI.
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Figure 3: Voting similarity with China. Changes in densities of voting similarities of African
states across all votes in the UNGA, votes on human rights issues, and votes where China
and USA vote differently.
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Figure 4: Share of trade with China over time. The plot shows changes in distributions of
the proportion of total trade by African states with China over time.
3.4 Model Specification
We examine the effects of trade with China on African foreign policy preferences using
a panel linear regression model that controls for country fixed effects. This allows us to
account for country-specific unobserved factors that are constant over time, and partly ad-
dress the issue of omitted variable bias. The inclusion of country fixed effects means that
our analysis focuses on how changes in a country’s share of trade with China influence their
foreign policy positions. In total, the models include 50 countries and cover a 42 year time
period (1971-2013). Therefore, this time period of the analysis enables us to consider the
longer-term engagement of China in Africa. We address potential temporal dependence in
the robustness tests.
4 Results and Analysis
Table 1 presents the results of the impact of increased trade with China on the foreign policy
positions of African states. In Model 1, the outcome variable is the measure of position
derived from UN General Debate speeches using per year estimation with the Wordscores
classifier. The GD statements of China (-1) and the USA (+1) in that year are used as
reference texts. The results show that an increase in the share of trade with China leads
African states to move closer to the US and away from China in terms of the foreign policy
positions expressed in their General Debate statements. This result is statistically significant
at the 99% confidence level.
The outcome variable in Model 2 is the similarity of voting patterns in the UNGA be-
tween African states and China across all UN resolutions during this time period. The results
demonstrate that increased trade has no statistically significant effect on the similarity of
Chinese and African voting patterns in the UNGA. This may reflect China’s “no questions
12
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Polity 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
GDPpc (log) -0.029 0.077 0.070 0.080
(0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.026)
Trade/GDP -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.005
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Population (log) -0.679 -0.062 -0.134 0.231
(0.038) (0.046) (0.044) (0.059)
China trade share 0.395 0.058 0.221 -0.429
(0.125) (0.105) (0.097) (0.158)
USA trade share 0.013 -0.097 -0.078 -0.139
(0.078) (0.152) (0.142) (0.193)
USA aid/GDP -0.996 0.942 0.836 1.072
(0.455) (0.732) (0.749) (0.640)
Post Cold War 0.086 -0.075 -0.064 -0.099
(0.014) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027)
Natural resources/GDP 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 10.597 1.289 2.467 -3.332
(0.539) (0.660) (0.631) (0.876)
N 1756 1756 1756 1756
N Countries 50 50 50 50
Adj R2 0.463 0.126 0.158 0.135
RMSE 0.179 0.155 0.154 0.163
Table 1: Results of effects of trade share with China on African states’ foreign policy positions.
Note: Grayed out coefficients in bold are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or lower.
We use panel linear models with country fixed effects. The outcome variables in the models
are as follows: Model 1 - Wordscores measure (GD speeches); Model 2 - voting similarity
with China across all UNGA resolutions; Model 3 - voting similarity with China on human
rights resolutions; Model 4 - voting similarity with China on UNGA resolutions where China
and USA disagree.
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asked foreign policy”. In Model 3, we consider voting similarity between China and African
states on human rights-related resolutions in the UNGA. This, as we have explained, is based
on the argument that the Chinese government has consistently opposed resolutions in the
UNGA on human rights issues (see Flores-Macías and Kreps, 2013). The results in Table
1 suggest that an increase in the share of trade an African country engages in with China
has a statistically significant effect on its likelihood to vote in agreement with China on
human rights issues. In other words, the more trade undertaken by African countries with
China, the more likely they are to align themselves with China in opposing UN resolutions
on human rights.
Finally, Model 4 in Table 1 considers voting similarity between African states and China
on resolutions in the UNGA where China and the US differ in how they voted. We consider
whether a greater share of trade with China makes African states more likely to vote in
agreement with China or the US on votes where there was disagreement between China and
the US. The results demonstrate a statistically significant negative relationship. Therefore,
an increase in the share of trade engaged in by African countries with China makes them
less likely to vote in agreement with China on resolutions where the US and China differed
in their vote.
The results provided in Table 1 would appear to suggest that greater trade between
China and African states has a mixed, and somewhat paradoxical, effect on foreign policy
preferences. An increase in trade share has no effect on voting similarity between African
states and China when we consider all votes in the UNGA. However, when we consider only
human rights votes, we find that an increase in the trade share between African states and
China leads to more similar foreign policy positions. If we consider UN General Debate
speeches and UNGA votes where China and the US differ, we find the opposite result; an
increase in trade share with China leads African states to move further away from China in
terms of their preferences. In terms of GD speeches, we find that more trade with China
leads African states to express foreign policy positions in their General Debate statements
that are closer to the US and further from China.
While these results may appear paradoxical, we argue that they provide strong support
for the argument that African governments use trade with China to strengthen their po-
sition globally by balancing Chinese against Western power to achieve greater autonomy
and maximize resources. African states use economic engagement with China to strengthen
their domestic and international sovereignty by trying to promote non-interference in re-
lation to domestic human rights. In other words, Chinese trade creates issue-specific allies
around a hard shell sovereignty. Hence, we see that more trade with China leads to African
governments voting more similarly to China in opposing human rights-related UN resolu-
tions. However, beyond the issue of human rights, African governments seek to balance
their growing trade relationship with China by moving closer to the West, specifically the
USA, at least in this forum.
These results support findings from analyses of the engagement of individual African
states with China and the US. For example, there has been some discussion of how the
Angolan political elite has adopted such a strategy to ensure that it maintains relations
with a variety of external partners and avoids being dominated by China (see Carmody
and Kragelund, 2016; Shinn and Eisenman, 2012). Therefore, rather than growing trade
between China and African states leading to a growing foreign policy alliance between
China and African states as might be expected, these governments appear to be using this
growing trade to play off the rival powers in order to strengthen their own autonomy, and
attract more trade, aid and investment from the US, as China’s assistance comes with ‘no
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strings attached’. Hence, we see a greater share of trade with China leading to African states
moving closer to the US and away from China in terms of foreign policy positions expressed
in the UN General Debate and in voting on resolutions where there is disagreement between
China and the US.
4.1 Additional Tests
We conduct additional tests to further examine the relationship between trade with China
and African foreign policy positions. We first examine further whether African governments
look to balance growing trade with China by moving closer to the US in their foreign policy
positions. The first model in Table 2 once more examines votes in the UNGA where China
and the US disagree. While we previously established that a higher share of trade with
China makes African states less likely to vote the same way as China on such resolutions,
we now consider whether increased trade with China makes African states more likely to
vote with the US on votes where the US and China differ.
In Model 6 in Table 2, we consider voting on resolutions that are deemed ‘important’
by the US State Department. As the international relations literature has discussed, the
US State Department provides a list of the resolutions in the UNGA that it considers to be
important and on which it monitors whether countries, particularly those that receive US
aid, vote in agreement with the US (see Wang, 1999). If growing trade with China leads
African governments to move closer to the US on some foreign policy dimensions, we would
expect to see this with votes the US considers important.
Figure 5 presents a ridgeline plot of changing distribution of voting similarities with
the US on votes where the US and China differ and votes deemed “important” by the US
State Department. We observe a general trend of decreasing voting similarity with the US,
particularly on important votes, although there is a recent pick up in similarity, perhaps as
the unipolar post-Cold War moment has passed.
The results in Model 5 suggest that this is the case – an increased trade share with
China makes African states more likely to vote in accordance with the US where there is
disagreement between China and the US. The results of Model 6 show that an increase in
trade share with China makes African states more likely to vote in agreement with the US
on these important resolutions. These additional tests, therefore, provide further support
that African states seek to balance increased trade with China by moving closer to the US
in some areas of foreign policy.
We conduct several additional tests to demonstrate the robustness of our findings. These
results are provided in the supplementary material. We show that lagging trade share with
China and the US does not alter our findings. We also separately consider imports from
China as a share of trade and exports to China as a share of trade. While there are minor
differences in the results, this analysis does not alter the general picture provided by the
analysis. Furthermore, we address potential temporal dependence by fitting a cubic spline
to the regression models. Our findings remain consistent when a cubic spline is included
as we discuss in the supplementary material. We continue to find support for the argument
that African states engage in balancing behavior. Likewise, the inclusion of extra control
variables, such as countries’ human rights records and whether a country is involved in an
ongoing conflict, does not significantly impact our findings.
Our argument in this paper focuses on the foreign policy consequences of trade with
China for African countries. Therefore, it is important to address potential endogeneity in
this relationship. It may be that rather than trade leading to foreign policy positions, the
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Figure 5: Voting similarity with US. Changes in densities of voting similarities of African
states across votes where China and USA vote differently and votes classified as “important”
by the US State Department.
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Model 5 Model 6
Polity 0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.002)
GDPpc (log) -0.015 0.060
(0.011) (0.019)
Trade/GDP -0.004 -0.011
(0.001) (0.002)
Population (log) -0.246 -0.536
(0.021) (0.046)
China trade share 0.414 0.586
(0.063) (0.108)
USA trade share 0.032 -0.095
(0.053) (0.071)
USA aid/GDP -0.318 0.837
(0.157) (0.568)
Post Cold War 0.053 -0.042
(0.006) (0.032)
Natural resources/GDP -0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001)
Constant 3.974 8.550
(0.316) (0.644)
N 1756 1756
N Countries 50 50
Adj R2 0.369 0.450
RMSE 0.062 0.164
Table 2: Additional results of trade with China on African states’ foreign policy positions. Note:
Grayed out coefficients in bold are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or lower. We use
panel linear models with country fixed effects. The outcome variables in the models are as
follows: Model 5 - voting similarity with the USA on UNGA resolutions where China and
USA disagree; Model 6 - voting similarity with the USA on important UNGA resolutions.
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relationship is the other way around. African governments may choose foreign policy posi-
tions in order to foster more trade with China. The findings of our analysis – that increased
trade with China generally leads African states to move closer to the US – would appear to
counter concerns about potential endogeneity. However, it may still be argued that these
governments move closer to the US foreign policy position to encourage the Chinese gov-
ernment to increase its economic engagement with, or assistance to, these countries. In
order to address potential endogeneity, we exploit differences between African states that
have diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and those that have
diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan).
In 1971 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution transferring China’s seat on the
UN Security Council from the Republic of China to the PRC. Over time, most states have
switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC.11 However, some states – includ-
ing in Africa – continue to formally recognize Taiwan. Burkina Faso, for example, until
recently had full diplomatic relations with Taiwan, leaving eSwatini the only African state
to recognize Taiwan. Furthermore, there are differences between countries in terms of
when they switched their recognition to PRC. For example, Ghana never formally recog-
nized Taiwan, and established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1960, while Malawi
switched from Taiwan to the PRC as recently as 2008, Sao Tome and Principe in 2016, and
Burkina Faso in 2018. It is also worth noting that several countries – including the Central
African Republic, Chad, and Liberia – have switched back and forth, in recognizing one or
the other.
We argue that countries choosing not to recognize the PRC are unlikely to use the foreign
policy positions expressed in their General Debate speeches or their votes in the UN General
Assembly to seek to increase their trade with China. If these countries were trying to use
foreign policy positions to foster trade with China then the most obvious option would
be to recognize the PRC. As such, we examine the relationship between trade with China
and foreign policy positions among African states that do not have diplomatic relations with
China (PRC) for a given year. This enables us to address the issue of endogeneity as changes
in foreign policy positions among these states must follow from changes in trade share with
China. We provide the results of the analysis in Table 3 and use the six dependent variables
previously examined.
The results provided in Table 3 are broadly consistent with our previous findings. The
results show that a greater trade share with China leads to countries moving closer to the US
and away from China in terms of the GD statements (Model 7). We also find that an increase
in trade share with China leads to greater voting similarity with the US on votes where there
is disagreement between China and the US (Model 11), and votes the US considers to be
important (Model 12). We find that there is no relationship between trade with China and
voting alignment across all votes (Model 8). The analysis differs to the previous results on
voting on human rights resolutions (Model 9). Here we find that increased trade with China
has no effect on these African states’ voting on human rights issues. This, however, is in line
with our expectations, as we would not expect countries that do not formally recognize the
PRC to seek to align with it on human rights issues due to increased trade. We also find that
trade with China has no effect on voting similarity with China on resolutions where China
and the US differ (Model 10). In general, however, the analysis provides support for our
findings on the paradoxical impact of trade with China on African foreign policy positions
and the balancing argument.
Our analysis suggest that African countries are engaged in balancing behavior in relation
11Some states, such as Ghana, formally recognized the PRC before the 1971 UN resolution.
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Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Polity -0.001 -0.005 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.013
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
GDPpc (log) 0.026 0.106 0.089 0.108 -0.046 0.033
(0.037) (0.103) (0.104) (0.094) (0.031) (0.075)
Trade/GDP -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.003 -0.007 -0.020
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007)
Population (log) -0.774 -0.119 -0.197 0.041 -0.306 -0.577
(0.122) (0.263) (0.281) (0.210) (0.081) (0.214)
China trade share 1.324 0.676 1.004 0.133 0.786 1.352
(0.439) (0.694) (0.676) (0.777) (0.194) (0.627)
USA trade share -0.242 -0.250 -0.218 -0.234 0.048 -0.274
(0.232) (0.257) (0.276) (0.238) (0.104) (0.241)
USA aid/GDP -1.709 1.895 1.736 2.166 -0.659 2.329
(1.524) (1.517) (1.605) (1.093) (0.399) (1.062)
Post Cold War 0.056 0.035 0.053 0.013 0.078 0.125
(0.052) (0.098) (0.100) (0.097) (0.037) (0.082)
Natural resources/GDP 0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.000 0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Constant 11.372 1.765 3.037 -0.690 4.924 8.831
(1.722) (3.388) (3.645) (2.684) (1.161) (2.899)
N 208 208 208 208 208 208
N Countries 20 20 20 20 20 20
Adj R2 0.456 0.050 0.062 0.066 0.493 0.322
RMSE 0.172 0.206 0.207 0.193 0.069 0.184
Table 3: Results of trade with China on foreign policy positions of African states with no diplo-
matic relations with PRC. Note: Grayed out coefficients in bold are statistically significant
at the 0.05 level or lower. We use panel linear models with country fixed effects. The out-
come variables in the models are as follows: Model 7 - Wordscores measure (GD speeches);
Model 8 - voting similarity with China across all UNGA resolutions; Model 9 - voting sim-
ilarity with China on human rights resolutions; Model 10 - voting similarity with China
on UNGA resolutions where China and USA disagree; Model 11 - voting similarity with the
USA on UNGA resolutions where China and USA disagree; Model 12 - voting similarity with
the USA on important UNGA resolutions.
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to their engagements with China. However, this balancing is perhaps more focused on
internal politics than the threat of external military intervention (the traditional realist
explanation for balancing). African governments, as a rule, are highly focused on regime
maintenance and balancing between great powers may not only yield additional resources
which can be deployed to strengthen authority domestically (Peiffer and Englebert, 2012),
but also allow for maximum policy latitude and autonomy by avoiding over-dependence on
one or a set of donors.
5 Conclusion
The political implications of China’s growing economic ties with African states has been the
subject of much recent attention. This paper has systematically analyzed the impact of Chi-
nese trade on African foreign policy positions by examining the effects of trade on UNGA
voting patterns and annual statements in the UN General Debate. Our analysis demon-
strates that, with the exception of voting on human rights-related resolutions in the UNGA,
an increase in trade with China leads to African states aligning more with the US in their
foreign policy positions at the UN. To avoid becoming overly dependent on China and maxi-
mize resources and autonomy, African states that increase their trade dependence on China
move closer to the US foreign policy position.
The attempt to seek greater autonomy by African governments is further demonstrated
by the shift towards China’s position when it comes to human rights votes in the UNGA.
China has long been an opponent of resolutions promoting human rights on the basis that
this would infringe on national sovereignty. We argue that African states align with China on
this issue based on a similar view. Indeed, the recent threat by several African governments
to withdraw from the International Criminal Court – with South Africa having begun this
process, and Burundi having already withdrawn – provides a further example of African
states opposing the human rights agenda to prioritize domestic autonomy.12 Therefore, the
link between increased trade and voting alignment with China on this issue provides further
support for the argument that African governments are seeking to leverage their growing
economic ties with China to enhance their autonomy.
Therefore, while the study provides some support for recent calls for greater recognition
of the agency of African governments in shaping external relations; our findings also high-
light the limits of this agency. African governments have managed to secure some limited
policy autonomy by engaging in this balancing behavior between China and the traditional
Western powers rather than being able to reshape these relations, which are still character-
ized by dependence (see Taylor, 2014; Carmody and Kragelund, 2016). We would therefore
argue that the analysis suggests that the balancing behavior of African governments with
regard to their relations with China is more in line with what Randeria (2003) has termed
“cunning states”, which read the internal and external political opportunity structures to
maximize the possibilities for regime maintenance.
12See for example: https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/jan/31/
african-leaders-plan-mass-withdrawal-from-international-criminal-court,
accessed 28 May 2018.
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